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LAW FOR A WORLD . COMMUNITY 
John Quigley* 
Changes in international relations are creating a context for a 
new role for law. The danger of destruction through nuclear war or, 
increasingly, through environmental spoliation, has lent a sense of 
urgency to the search for new measures. The exigencies of survival 
require solutions that can be achieved only at a supranational 
level. States have shown a greater willingness to seek such solu-
tions, and non-state actors are increasingly taking a role to bring 
them about. 
In the process, international law is being transformed from a 
law between and among states to a law that includes international 
organizations, individual persons, corporations, and other non-
state groups. It is moving from a set of negative prohibitions that 
sought to keep states from injuring each other by acts of violence 
to a set of positive obligations to preserve and improve life for all. 
Law is shifting from being an interstate law to a law for a world 
community. 
In the 1980s a new factor opened greater vistas for the emer-
gence of a world community capable of confronting the survival 
issues. This factor was the beginning of an end to the Cold War 
that had hindered international cooperation on a wide range of is-
sues. This article examines the trend towards the creation of a 
world community law that is reflected in important changes that 
have occurred in international law to meet the survival challenge, 
and others that have resulted from the ending of the Cold War. 
I. THE DIMINUTION OF THE COLD WAR 
Marx's criticism of capitalism introduced a split among the 
major powers. The implementation of that criticism in Russia, like 
the introduction of a free market and liberal democracy in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe, divided states 
into two camps. Unified goals for an international community 
could not be achieved while that division continued. The Cold War 
that developed from this division kept the world community from 
addressing common problems in a collective fashion. 
At mid-century, superpower conflict dominated international 
relations, with the U.S.S.R. arrayed against the United States. As 
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colonial territories became independent in the 1960s and 1970s, a 
South-North conflict superimposed itself on the East-West. The 
South-North conflict in marginal ways overtook the East-West 
conflict, but the East-West conflict remained a prominent feature. 
In the United Nations Security Council, U.S.-Soviet rivalry re-
mained a key factor, though more frequently it became the United 
States that was alone among the five permanent members, and 
therefore, exercised a veto rather than, as earlier, the U.S.S.R. 
Developments in the 1980s presaged a path towards the heal-
ing of the division. The superpowers reduced the level of their mu-
tual hostility. The initiative came from the Soviet Union, though 
the United States claimed that the initiative was a response to its 
own high levels of military spending and its use of military force 
during the early 1980s. 
Whatever the origin, the Soviet Union espoused a revised view 
of East-West relations that emphasized peaceful collaboration over 
military preparedness.1 Calling "confrontation" in U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
relations "an anomaly,"2 the Soviet Communist Party said that the 
Soviet Union's relations with the West did not have to be based on 
class struggle.3 Previously, it said that the Soviet government rep-
resented the proletariat, that Western governments represent~d 
the bourgeoisie, and that the two were on a collision course. 4 "The 
struggle of two opposing systems is no longer the tendency that 
defines the contemporary era," ran the revised Soviet analysis of 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.6 
The West responded cautiously to the initiative but eventually 
1. See Quigley, Perestroika and International Law, 82 AM. J . lNT'L L. 788, 793-94 
(1988). 
2. M. GORBACHEV, A TIME FOR PEACE 67 (1985). 
3. Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Novaia Redaktsiia, 
Priniata XXVII S'ezdom KPSS [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 
New Edition, adopted by the XXVII Congress of the CPSU], Pravda, Mar. 7, 1986, at 3, 7 
(deleting phrase "class struggle" from definition of peaceful coexistence); M. GORBACHEV, 
PERESTROIKA I NovoE MYSHLENIE DLIA NASHEI STRANY I DLIA VSEGO MIRA [Re-Structuring 
and the New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World] 150 (1987); Vereshchetin 
& Miullerson, Novoe Myshlenie i Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo [The New Thinking and Interna-
tional Law], 1988(3) Sov. Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 3, 5 (class struggle no longer 
a feature of peaceful coexistence). 
4. On the prior view, see McWhinney, Changing International Law Method and Objec-
tives in the Era of the Soviet- Western Detente, 59 AM. J . lNT'L L. 1, 2-4 (1965); Quigley, 
The New Soviet Approach to International Law, 7 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1965). 
5. E. Shevardnadze, Academic Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U .S.S.R., 
paraphrased in XIX Vsesoiuznaia Konferentsiia KPSS: Vneshniaia Politika i Diplomatiia 
[The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy], Izvestiia, 
July 27, 1988, at 4, col. 1. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/2
1989] Law for a World Community 3 
put forward counter-proposals aimed at reducing tension. 
"[C]apitalism and communism now sit on the same side of the ta-
ble facing the common threat of nuclear war," said economist John 
Kenneth Galbraith. 6 
Galbraith suggested that weak economic performance by both 
the U.S.S.R. and United States made them less formidable to each 
other. "Neither American capitalism nor Soviet socialism," he said, 
"any longer projects the image of success that once induced fear in 
the other country."7 The economic power of North America and 
Western Europe was eroding. On the list of states with highest per 
capita income, Arab states occupied several positions. Japan over-
took the U .S.S.R. as the second largest economy and surpassed the 
United States in many areas of production. "For each speech in 
the American Congress on the socialist threat of , the Soviet 
Union," Galbraith said, "there are now at least ten on the eco-
nomic threat of Japan."8 
Changes in economic style in the two states may also have 
contributed to the change. By the 1980s, the differences in the cap-
italist and socialist systems that had earlier seemed so great no 
longer posed an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations. In a 
process of mutual emulation, capitalist states had introduced gov-
ernmental regulation of the private economy, while socialist states 
introduced market elements and curtailed state power over society. 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that Japan 
and West Germany became economic powers after World War II 
not by building up their military establishments but by avoiding 
military spending.9 In the Soviet view, the U.S.S.R. needed to de-
velop economically without the burden of heavy military expendi-
ture.10 Thus, it needed to reduce its military establishment and to 
avoid war. 11 The U .S.S.R. made radical proposals for arms control 
calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 
2000. It made substantial unilateral reductions in troop strength in 
6. Galbraith, The Dynamics of Change, HARV. MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 17, 19. 
7. Id. at 18. 
8. Id. 
9. Gorbachev, Oktiabr' i Perestroika: Revoliutsiia Pro,dolzhaetsia [October and Re-
Structuring: The Revolution Continues], lzvestiia, Nov. 3, 1987, at 2, col. 1, 4, col. 4 (report 
to joint session of central committee of CPSU, Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R., Supreme Soviet 
of RSFSR, 70th Anniversary of October Revolution). 
10. See Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone & Kissinger, East-West Relations, 68 FOREIGN 
AFF. 1, 3 (1989). 
11. M. GORBACHEV, supra note S. at 5. 
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Eastern Europe.12 NATO responded with proposals for significant 
reductions.13 Arms control agreements permitted highly invasive 
on-site inspection. 
The military blocs-NATO and the Warsaw Pact-that domi-
nated the world's security scene in the 1960s were by the 1980s less 
formidable and less adversarial. China no longer sided with the 
U.S.S.R. Differences among the member states of the two blocs 
made them seem less threatening, as united action by them in a 
crisis could not be assured. Differences of view surfaced between 
member states of the Warsaw Pact. They criticized each other on 
human rights issues. They took differing paths of economic reform. 
In NATO, the United States insisted on a larger military establish-
ment, while the European members held back. Germany emerged 
as a strong voice for disarmament, pressuring other NATO states 
to go far in the direction of the reductions called for by the 
U.S.S.R. The planned elimination of trade barriers within the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC) in 1992 threatened a further 
separation of the European NATO states from the United States, 
particularly as the EEC came to act as a unit not only in economic 
matters, but on political issues as well. 
Military intervention in other states declined. The U.S.S.R. 
abandoned its traditional doctrine of wars of national liberation. 
This shift took the superpower element, to some degree, out of ex-
isting regional conflicts and might mean that other potential re-
gional conflicts will not develop into military hostilities. In the late 
1980s, the United States and the U.S.S.R. reduced the level of con-
tention between them in a number of long-standing conflicts-in 
Afghanistan, Western Sahara, Cambodia and Angola. The United 
States has justified its own military intervention in Third World 
states as a counter to the U .S.S.R. If the U .S.S.R. is not widely 
perceived as involved in such activity, the United States will not 
be able to use its traditional justification. Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Henry Kissinger said that the 
new Soviet diplomacy on arms control and regional conflicts repre-
sented "a new concept of security."14 
12. Keller, Gorbachev Pledges Major Troop Cutback, Then Ends Trip, Citing Vast 
Soviet Quake, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8. 1988, at Al, col. 6; Gorbachev's U.N. Surprise: Soviet 
Arms Cuts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1988, at A18, col. 1. 
13. N.A.T.O., A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, May 30, 
1989, in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE NATO SUMMIT: 40 YEARS OF SuccEss (Selected Docu-
ments No. 37). 
14. Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone & Kissinger, supra note 10, at 3. 
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The differences in domestic politics that had separated the 
two states has diminished as well, with the reforms initiated by the 
U .S.S.R. in the 1980s. A movement towards parliamentary rule 
with multiple political parties held the promise of eliminating a 
difference that had been used by the NATO states as a reason to 
fear an attack from the Warsaw Pact states. The U.S.S.R. under-
took a major reform of its legal system under the rubric "a socialist 
state under the rule of law," which aimed to strengthen the role of 
the courts and to make the government more accountable to the 
citizenry.16 
II. NEW INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 
Gorbachev has addressed a range of survival issues. The world, 
he said, had become increasingly interdependent through the "in-
ternationalization of economic connections" and the technological 
revolution. Greater international cooperation is needed to solve 
critical world problems, like, "ecological danger," the "crying social 
problems of the developing world," the nuclear arms race, and the 
increasing scarcity of resources.16 He said that an end to the arms 
race and East-West rapprochement opened the door to the possi-
bility of dealing effectively with global survival. Foreign Minister 
Edward Shevardnadze said that "the struggle of two opposing sys-
tems is no longer the tendency that defines the contemporary era. 
At the contemporary stage what is important is the ability to in-
crease material benefits as quickly as possible on the basis of ad-
vanced sciences and to distribute them justly, and to restore and 
protect the resources necessary for the survival of mankind.m7 
Collaboration came to be viewed as "the most important com-
ponent" of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and socialist 
states.18 The two types of states should "interact closely" in "scien-
tific-technical, economic, and social spheres, in human relations, 
and in solving global problems."19 They should pursue "common 
15. Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet Courts, 27 CoLUM. J . TRANSNAT'L L. - (1989); 
Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. -
(1990). 
16. Gorbachev, supra note 9, at 2, col. 1. See also F. BERNTHAL, RECOGNIZING THE 
GLOBAL NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 1198 
(1989)). 
17. E. Shevardnadze, supra note 5, at 4, col. 1. 
18. Vereshchetin & Miullerson, supra note 3, at 5; see also Mullerson [Miullerson], 
Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 
495 (1989). 
19. V.A. Medvedev, Member, Politburo, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, para-
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human values. "20 
Food security came to be a problem that posed as much diffi-
culty as military security. Malnutrition was estimated to affect 
thirty percent of the world's population in the 1980s.21 The world 
population in the late twentieth century was expanding at a rate 
that yielded a doubling in only thirty-five years.22 The highest 
rates of population growth were in states where chronic hunger af-
fected large segments of the population.23 As the world's popula-
tion rose, the task of feeding its population became more diffi-
cult.H Large segments of the world's population became 
chronically underfed. Soil erosion threatened to make it impossible 
to provide enough food. 
Economic integration may be more conducive to peace because 
of the interdependency it creates. States that rely on each other for 
basic products may not want to risk losing access to them. Further, 
economic exchange may yield greater understanding that reduces 
the likelihood of resort to war. 
Ecological problems gave impetus to this development. A per-
ception grew that ecological deterioration could threaten human 
survival. 26 In the 1970s oil spills from large tankers caused consid-
erable damage, and in 1989 the spill of oil from the Exxon Valdez 
in Alaska caused catastrophic damage to marine and terrestrial 
life. In the 1980s acid rain-sulphur emissions from indus-
try-destroyed vast forests in central Europe and North America.26 
Carbon dioxide emissions brought a warming of the atmosphere 
phrased in Velikii Oktiabr' i Sovremennyi Mir [Great October and the Contemporary 
World], lzvestiia, Dec. 10, 1987, at 5, col. 6; see Remnick, New Ideologist Says West Can 
Teach Soviets, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 2. 
20. V.A. Medvedev, supra note 19, at 5, col. 6; Blishchenko, Na Puti k Sozdaniiu 
Novogo Mezhdunarodnogo Pravoporiadka [On the Path Towards Creating a New Interna-
tional Legal Order], 1989(4) Sov. Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 109, 110. 
21. J . DILLOWAY, Is WORLD ORDER EVOLVING? AN ADVENTURE INTO HUMAN POTENTIAL 19 
(1986). 
22. Id. at 7. 
23. Id. at 39-40. 
24. See Dong & Li, Food Situation Stirs Worldwide Concern, BEIJING REV. Feb. 6-12, 
1989, at 18. 
25. Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director, U.N. Environment Program, cited in J. DIL-
LOWAY, supra note 21, at 19; Timoshenko, Global'naia Ekologicheskaia Bezopas-
nost'-Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Aspekt [Global Ecological Security-The International-
Legal Aspect], 1989(1) Sov. Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 84. 
26. Rissburger, On the Brink of an Ecological Calamity: Acid Rain, Transboundary 
Air Pollution and Environmental Law in West Germany, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 
325 (1985); Scott, The Canadian-American Problem of Acid Rain (U.S.-Canada Trans-
boundary Resource Issues), 26 NAT. RES. J. 337 (1986). 
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called the "greenhouse effect" that threatened to alter the world 
climate and to render many areas uninhabitable. 27 Radiation emis-
sions from nuclear power plants, like the 1986 emission from the 
plant at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, threatened food supplies all 
over Europe. 28 Destruction of the Amazon forests threatened the 
planet's oxygen supply.29 Depletion of the ozone layer through the 
emission of chlorofluorocarbons threatened to admit more of the 
sun's cancer-causing rays. 30 Lester Brown summarized "the new 
sources of danger" as arising from "oil depletion, soil erosion, land 
degradation, shrinking forests, deteriorating grasslands, and cli-
mate alteration. "31 Many species of animals were endangered by 
environmental spoliation, and their survival was addressed by an 
increasing number of treaties. 
Social and economic problems came increasingly to be per-
ceived as global in character. Trafficking in drugs was addressed in 
an international context. The inability of many Third World states 
to repay debts to banks in developed states was perceived as an 
international issue, not simply as a matter of private collection of a 
debt. The economic gap between North and South came, at the 
insistence of the South, to be viewed as an international problem. 
International disasters, like famines in Africa and earthquakes in 
Mexico and Armenia, were viewed as requiring immediate action 
by other states. Private relief campaigns were undertaken on an 
unprecedented scale. 
Technological developments also brought increased danger 
from the possibility of physical harm inflicted by individuals. The 
threat of harm from acts by individuals or small groups came to be 
viewed as a serious international problem. Formerly, an individual 
could threaten only small numbers of other individuals. But in the 
latter part of the twentieth century, individuals or small groups 
could commandeer aircraft. Hand-held missiles gave individuals 
the capability of shooting down aircraft in flight. Nuclear technol-
ogy was so widespread that even small groups might assemble a 
27. Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375 (1989). 
28. See Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law Regu-
lating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
203, 206 (1987). 
29. Murphy, Implements for the World Garden, 54 EKISTICS 336, 340-41 (1987) (ad-
dress delivered July 1985). 
30. S. KIM, THE QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER 253-54 (1984). 
31. Brown, Redefining National Security, in THE GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 371, 372 (1988). 
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nuclear weapon. 
Increasingly sophisticated communications systems also 
brought the danger of harm at the international level. Injecting a 
virus into a computer system could disrupt communications sys-
tems worldwide. An individual "computer hacker" might interfere 
with military communications or medical care delivery. 
Wars continued to take their toll with many so-called "re-
gional conflicts" in many areas. The Palestine-Israel conflict per-
sisted as other regional conflicts were resolved. The threat of nu-
clear war remained, and concern became even greater following 
investigations showing that a major nuclear attack would affect not 
only the target area but substantial portions of the planet, whose 
capacity to support life would be eroded in what was called a "nu-
clear winter. "32 
Contributing to the perception of possible harms was the role 
played by the mass media. Events like the nuclear radiation leak in 
the Ukraine or the Palestine-Israel conflict were instantly brought 
, to the awareness of the public around the world. Public concern 
put pressure on government officials to deal witQ. issues and con-
flicts that in earlier times might have gone unnoticed. It also led to 
action by citizen groups. 
III. NEW GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR COLLABORATION 
A factor that opened the door to a new form of international 
collaboration was the potential exploitation of resources found in 
three previously inaccessible environments-Antarctica, outer 
· space and the deep seabed. Third World states urged that these 
resources should be exploited by international institutions to bene-
fit the international community as a whole, as the "common heri-
tage of mankind," with a preferential share to the poorest states. 
With respect to the deep se·abed, an international scheme was 
negotiated and in 1980, the United States backed away from what 
it called worldwide socialism and rejected internationalized admin-
istration of deep-sea resources. Space became a limited resource 
with the development of communication satellites, which became a 
primary tool for international communication. Only a limited num-
ber of good orbit trajectories (called geostationary orbits) could be 
used to transmit to earth. Developing states, as with the seabed, 
argued that orbiting locations constituted a "common heritage," 
32. Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: A Nuclear Winter, in THE GLOBAL 
AGENDA: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 409-424. 
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while developed states preferred allocation to those first able to 
use them. Some compromise was achieved. 33 In Antarctica, an 
agreement was negotiated to limit states in their exploitation of 
mineral resources. 34 
IV. SOUTH-NORTH TENSION OVER RESOURCE CONTROL 
Control of resources has long been a matter of international 
concern and tension. In the nineteenth century, as the industrial 
revolution required inputs from abroad and a market in which to 
sell mass-produced goods, European states competed with each 
other for control of foreign territory. In the late twentieth century 
the issue of control over resources took on a new dimension. The 
specter of a growing population and substantial starvation in de-
veloping states heightened the concern of those states that re-
sources in common areas be considered "common heritage," and 
that developed states give them an opportunity to catch up with 
them. 
The less developed states declined economically in comparison 
with the developed states. The terms of trade for their commodi-
ties steadily deteriorated through the latter twentieth century.a& 
Tariffs continued to be higher on raw materials, their chief ex-
ports, than on manufactured goods. 36 The developing states put 
forward a program that would require fair treatment for them on 
tariffs in developed states and would impose on developed states 
an obligation to assist them in the development process. In re-
sponse, a number of developed states adopted a "generalized sys-
tem of preferences" to give developing states lower tariffs than 
they gave to developed states for like commodities. 37 
The international debt crisis of the 1980s produced tension be-
tween developed and developing states, but the approach taken to 
it reflected a change in the international order. Full repayment 
would have brought such economic devastation to a number of 
33. See Kosmo, The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that Promotes 
Commercial Ventures and International Responsibility, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1988). 
34. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for 
signature Nov. 25. 1988, 27 l.L.M. 859 (1988); see Jacobsen, Recent Developments, Interna-
tional Agreements: Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 
opened for signature Nov. 25, 1988, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J . 237 (1989); Joyner, The Evolving 
Antarctic Minerals Regime, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 73 (1988). 
35. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 154-55; Head, South-North Dangers, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 71, 
80 (1989). 
36. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 155. 
37. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466. 
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states that their governments declared that they could not pay in 
full. The developed states had to consider the consequences of in-
sisting on repayment under the contractual terms to the continu-
ing relations between developing states and the developed world. It 
therefore compromised with proposals for partial debt reduction.38 
In the early twentieth century, a declaration of inability to pay by 
a Third World state might have led to the appearance of gunboats 
in the major port of such a state, but by the late twentieth century 
the economic inter-relations between the Third World states and 
the developed states made it necessary to find a solution that 
would continue the relationship. 
Tension developed between Brazil and other states over the 
Amazon forests, as it was realized that the cutting of those forests 
threatened the world's oxygen supply. Brazil argued that as a de-
veloping state it should be able to use its own resources to its best 
advantage, and that it need not give primary consideration to the 
effects on others. The alliances that developed on this issue re-
flected the new style of international process. Many other states 
were allied with non-governmental environmental organizations, 
and with those Brazilians who made a livelihood by tapping the 
Amazon trees to make rubber. All were arrayed against the Brazil-
ian government and Brazilian developers. 
The U.S.S.R. for the most part supported the newly indepen-
dent states in their quest for what they viewed as a more just in-
ternational economic and political order. It shared with them a 
concern that international law as it stood at mid-century was 
Western European-derived. Like them, it was wary of international 
custom as a source of law since that custom had been developed by 
Western Europe, and judges in international tribunals looked to 
Wes tern European practice to determine customary norms. Like 
them, it promoted multilateral treaties as a more appropriate vehi-
cle for establishing international-legal norms. 
Wariness about the Western European orientation of interna-
tional law also made both the Third World and the U.S.S.R. reluc-
tant to accept compulsory international adjudication. Both the 
substantive law and the personnel of international tribunals were 
viewed as Western-oriented. By the 1980s, however, this view had 
changed. The Third World came to command about half the seats 
on the International Court of Justice. Much of the law was by then 
to be found in multilateral treaties, in which the U .S.S.R. and the 
38. Sachs, Making the Brady Plan Work, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 87 (1989). 
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Third World had played a role. By the last decade of the century, 
the initiative in the expansion of international law had been taken 
over by the Third World and the U .S.S.R. and its allied states. 
V. THE EXPANDED OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As a common quest for survival assumed a more central role, 
the character of international law changed. International law came 
to regulate relations formerly left to domestic jurisdiction. 39 Inter-
national procedures increasingly invaded domestic legal processes. 
International law developed to create many new sets of norms, in-
cluding those relating to human rights, self-determination of peo-
ples, liability of a state for assisting another state to violate inter-
national law, liability of a state for high-risk domestic economic 
activity, mandatory rules from which states were not permitted to 
derogate, criminal liability on the part of individual persons, and 
criminal liability on the part of states. Taken together, these ex-
pansions gave international law a much more serious role in order-
ing legal relations. 
A. Human Rights 
The development in the twentieth century of human rights 
law seriously invaded domestic jurisdiction. Nineteenth century in-
ternational law had known humanitarian law, which protected in-
dividuals in wartime. It also knew "denial of justice," which pro-
tected an individual from ill treatment by a foreign government. 
But the wrong was deemed a wrong against the state of which the 
victim was a national, not a wrong directly against the victim. And 
the international law on denial of justice did not protect an indi-
vidual from her or his own government. 
Human rights law began with political rights but, largely at 
the urging of the Soviet Union, expanded to include social and eco-
nomic rights, like employment, education, and health care:'0 In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, at the insistence of Third 
World states,41 it expanded to such matters of common concern as 
39. Brownlie, The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law 
of Nations, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SocIETY 357, 368 (1984); Schwarzenberger, 
The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117 RECUEIL DES CouRs 1 
(1967). 
40. See Konst. SSSR, arts. 118-123 (U.S.S.R. Constitution 1936); A. CASSESE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 300-03 (1986). 
41. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 307. 
11
Quigley: Law for a  World Community
Published by SURFACE, 1989
12 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:1 
a right to a clean environment,"2 a right to food,43 a right to devel-
opment,"" and a right to peace (freedom from war).46 These mat-
ters were formulated as rights of the individual, or as collective 
rights of a group. There developed, for example, the notion that a 
people, as a collectivity, has a right to development, and that this 
included a duty for governments to promote the development of 
their citizens,46 and for developed states to pursue aid and trade 
policies that promote development in the Third W orld.47 
Regional and universal mechanisms to enforce human rights 
grew. Africa in the 1980s generated a treaty for a regional human 
rights mechanism, 48 and the Western Hemisphere, which already 
had one, upgraded it by establishing a human rights court. 49 In 
Arab states, proposals for a regional human rights treaty were 
aired. 60 A regional human rights treaty was advocated for Eastern 
Europe.1n The U.S.S.R. dropped its long-standing objection to in-
ternational monitoring of human rights on its territory.62 In 1989 it 
withdrew reservations it had filed to six human rights treaties by 
which it had opted out of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice for disputes over interpretation.53 
42. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration) June 5-16, 1972, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973); Timoshenko, 
supra note 25, at 86. 
43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217, Dec. 10, 1948, 3 
U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Gener-
ation for the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 442 (1981); THE RIGHT TO Fooo (P. Alston & 
K. Tomasevski eds. 1985). 
44. Marks, supra note 43, at 444-45. 
45. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, G.A. Res. 33/73, 33 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979)("Every ... human being ... has 
the inherent right to life in peace.") Vote: 138-0-2; Marks, supra note 43, at 445-46. 
46. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, chap. 2, art. 7, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 
(1975); J . D1LLOWAY, supra note 21, at 19. 
47. Marks, supra note 43, at 444. 
48. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986, 21 l.L.M. 58 (1982); 7 HuM. RTs. L.J. 403 (1986). 
49. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force June 
1978, Organization of American States, Official Records OEA/SER.K/XVI/1.1, Document 
65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). 
50. Youssoufi, Human Rights in Arab Countries, INT'L CoMM'N JURISTS REV. 33 (Dec. 
1987). 
51. Chkhikvadze, 0 Nekotorykh Mezhdunarodnykh Aspektakh Problemy Prav 
Cheloveka [On Certain International Aspects of the Issue of Human Rights] 1988(7) Sov. 
Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 85, 92. 
52. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 303; Quigley, Human Rights Study in Soviet 
Academia, 11 HuM. RTs. Q. 452, 457 (1989). 
53. Soviet Union Accepts Compulsory Jurisdiction of !CJ for Six Human Rights Con-
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The first and best developed regional system was that of 
Western Europe, which came to provide, in effect, a supranational 
appeals court for persons alleging violation of their rights in do-
mestic courts. This system had a strong impact on states. The Eu-
ropean Convention was accepted as domestic law in a number of 
states parties, and it had a strong impact on civil rights in the do-
mestic courts of state parties. 54 States parties typically complied 
with adverse decisions, as when the United Kingdom's decision re-
pealed the Northern Ireland sodomy statute after the European 
Court of Human Rights found it to violate the European Conven-
tion's right of privacy.66 In the European Convention for the Pre-
vention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Pun-
ishment, the European states agreed to a highly invasive procedure 
whereby an international panel had the right to visit prisons lo-
cated in their territory to verify allegations of physical abuse of 
detainees. 56 
The law regulating the conduct of warfare and post-war mili-
tary occupation also underwent significant change. It evolved from 
a law between states to a law in which individuals directly bore 
rights. The nineteenth century law on this topic, called humanita-
rian law, was based on treaty or customary-law duties between and 
among the belligerent powers. They agreed among themselves to 
refrain from torturing prisoners and to treat civilians humanely in 
territory they occupied. But in the late twentieth century, human 
rights law invaded this domain. Increasingly, states viewed those 
caught up in war as bearing rights under human rights law. Thus, 
if a belligerent power in occupation of foreign territory violated the 
rights of individuals, it might be accused of violating human rights 
norms.57 
Human rights law challenged the traditional structure of in-
ventions, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1989) (Letter of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to U.N. 
Secretary-General, Feb. 28, 1989). 
54. Danish Center of Human Rights, The Implementation in National Law of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights: Proceedings of the Fourth Copenhagen Conference 
on Human Rights, 28 and 29 October 1988 (1989). 
55. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). 
56. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, Council of Europe Doc. H 
(87) 4, reprinted in 27 l .L.M. 1152 (1988); See Cassese, A New Approach to Human Rights: 
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, 83 AM. J. INT1L L. 128, 139-45 
(1989). 
57. See Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and the Law of Belligerent 
Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom of Assembly and Ex-
pression?, 12 BOSTON C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
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ternational law in three ways. First, it gave rights to individuals. It 
posited that the individual, regardless of any affiliation with a 
state, has rights that may not be violated by any state. Second, 
human rights law invaded domestic jurisdiction in a serious way. It 
opened a vast area of state conduct to international scrutiny. This 
aspect of human rights law led to opposition to it. In the United 
States, in particular, the Senate opposed adhering to human rights 
treaties, out of concern that such issues as race relations would be-
come the subject of international investigation. Whether a state 
gives equal treatment to all its citizens, whether it incarcerates ar-
bitrarily, whether it gives a right to counsel in criminal cases-all 
these became matters of international concern. In 1989 the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights found the conditions under which 
prisoners condemned to death are held to be subject to interna-
tional scrutiny. It said that if the United Kingdom were to extra-
dite to Virginia a person accused of a capital offense, the person 
would be subjected to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment" under Article 3 of the European Convention, since it found 
those conditions deficient. 68 
Third, human rights law involved obligations from one state to 
another. A state obligation not to violate the rights of the individ-
ual was considered to run not only to the individual but to other 
states. Thus, if a state violated the rights of a given individual it 
thereby violated an obligation to all other states. This concept was 
expressed by the International Court of Justice when it said that 
human rights norms are norms erga omnes, meaning that each 
state is obliged before every other state to observe human rights. 69 
As formulated in 1949, this same erga omnes concept adhered 
in humanitarian law. The four 1949 Geneva conventions regulating 
the conduct of belligerent states all included an identical Article 1 
that required states not only to observe the convention but to en-
sure respect for it by the other signatory states.60 Thus, states un-
58. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (ser. A) (1989); Quigley & Shank, Death Row as a 
Violation of Human Rights: ls It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J . INT'L L. -
(1990). 
59. Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 l.C.J. 32; Brownlie, To What Extent Are 
the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still Viable?, in CHANGE AND STA-
BILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 66, 71 (1988) [hereinafter CHANGE AND STABILITY]. 
60. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treat-
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dertook an obligation to encourage other states to observe the con-
ventions. This idea went beyond the traditional view that only in 
the event of breach were another signatory state's rights affected. 
The common Article 1 imposed on signatory states, even prior to a 
breach by another, an obligation to encourage compliance. Thus, 
each signatory state was responsible for any individual anywhere 
who might need the convention's protection. This idea was reflec-
tive of a world community approach, as opposed to a notion of a 
treaty as simply a contract between two states. 
B. Self-Determination of Peoples 
The right to self-determination developed at the same period 
as human rights law.61 It too took international law beyond the 
realm of interstate relationships. It posited that certain groupings 
of individuals, based on their culture and history, have interna-
tional standing, and a right to determine their own political status. 
The law of self-determination also included the requirement that a 
state administering the territory of another people must do so in 
the interests of that people, not for its own gain.62 Self-determina-
tion was viewed as a prerequisite for peace, since peoples forcibly 
deprived of freedom could be expected to fight to attain it. In this 
way it took a more sophisticated approach to preserving the peace, 
since it looked not to the outbreak of hostilities but to an underly-
ing cause of hostilities. 
Support for self-determination was strengthened by the en-
trance of former colonies onto the international stage as new 
states. Their own history of being denied self-determination ori-
ented them to championing self-determination in international 
law.63 International institutions took up self-determination situa-
ment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.l.A.S. No. 
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
61. Quigley, Palestine's Declaration of Independence and the Right of the Palestinians 
to Statehood, 7 BosTON U. INT'L L.J. 1, 2-12 (1989). 
62. Quigley, The Legality of Military Bases in Non-Self-Governing Territory: The 
Case of United States Bases in Puerto Rico, 16 DENVER J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 323, 324-26 
(1988). 
63. One exception relates to self-determination of peoples within the borders of those 
newly independent states. The fact that colonial boundaries had been drawn in disregard of 
the territories occupied by national groupings meant that the boundaries, particularly of 
Africa, were arbitrary. The African states feared that if those boundaries were qu~stioned, 
anarchy would prevail on the continent. The new states also, of course, had a self-interest in 
maintaining control over the territory they inherited from the colonial powers. 
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tions, like those involving the people of Namibia, Western Sahara, 
Palestine, or Puerto Rico. States began to pressure those states 
that denied self-determination, as in the Security Council-spon-
sored commercial boycott of Southern Rhodesia following the es-
tablishment there of a racial minority government,6• and its arms 
embargo against South Africa.65 Individual states began to pres-
sure states that violated the right of self-determination by refusing 
or limiting commercial relations. 66 
The law of self-determination acquired renewed significance in 
the 1980s when many ethnic groups within constituted states 
pressed longstanding claims to independence or greater autonomy. 
The Kurds in various Middle Eastern states, the Sikhs in India, 
Native Americans in the United States, Hungarians in Romania, 
Turks in Bulgaria, Croats in Yugoslavia, and the republic popula-
tions of the U .S.S.R. all claimed group rights. This pressure kept 
self-determination a significant issue even as colonialism of the 
nineteenth century variety gradually ended. 
C. A Prohibition Against Facilitating Wrongs by Other States 
Another new norm that expanded the reach of international law 
was complicity. In the latter half of the twentieth century a norm 
emerged to prohibit material aid to another state that uses the aid 
to violate internationally protected rights. 67 It developed in re-
sponse to changes in the international order. The superpower 
states had acquired the potential to involve other states in their 
own violations of international law. They used the territory of 
other states to station their troops, giving rise to the question of 
the responsibility of the host state if the guest troops committed 
aggression against some third state. In addition, the superpower 
states possessed the resources to provide other states with the 
means to accomplish tasks that they themselves either could not or 
did not want to undertake directly. Finally, by giving material aid 
to other states, they made it possible for those states to undertake 
operations it might not otherwise have been able to undertake, and 
64. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dees. 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1968). 
65. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dees. 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1978). 
66. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1986). 
67. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 27 in Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 187-96, U.N. Doc. 
A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 78-80, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
1978/Add.1 (pt. 2); Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law 
of State Responsibility, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77, 95-104. 
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those operations might involve violations of internationally pro-
tected rights. A superpower state might, for example, give weap-
onry or ammunition that the recipient state would use in commit-
ting aggression. Some states cut off aid to states that committed 
serious human rights violations rights. They stopped sales of chem-
icals upon discovering that they were being used to manufacture 
chemical weapons. 68 
The recognition of the illegality of providing aid that would be 
used unlawfully represented a substantial refinement of the law of 
state responsibility. It mirrored a similar development in the do-
mestic criminal law of homicide, where historically the first act 
prohibited was infliction of death. At that stage of society, criminal 
law aimed at reconciling two parties and preventing private ven-
geance. Only later, when criminal law undertook to protect the en-
tire community did there arise a criminal prohibition against ancil-
lary forms of conduct, like complicity, attempt, or conspiracy.69 
These forms of liability reflected a concept of a community with 
interests to protect, the off ender having manifested a dangerous-
ness that might result in future criminal acts. 
Similarly, the emergence in international law of a norm that 
prohibited states from materially aiding a wrongful act by another 
state reflected a concept of community interests. A state providing . 
aid was responsible for harm that might be caused by another 
state, even though it, as the donor, had not been directly involved 
in bringing about that harm. 
A prohibition against helping other states to violate interna-
tional.:legal norms was not confined to material aid. In Soering, the 
United Kingdom extradition case cited above, the European Court 
of Human Rights imposed on the United Kingdom an obligation 
not to extradite a person to Virginia. It said that Virginia would 
violate the person's rights. Yet it said that the United Kingdom 
would violate the European Convention by, in effect, giving Vir-
ginia the opportunity to violate the person's rights. The United 
Kingdom would itself violate international law by facilitating a vio-
lation by Virginia. 70 
D. Responsibility for High Risk Activity 
State responsibility also expanded in ·response to ecological 
68. Quigley, supra note 67, at 83-95. 
69. T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 452-54 (5th ed. 1956). 
70. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (ser. A) (1989). 
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dangers. As pollution became a more serious problem, states were 
held responsible to prevent the emission from their territory of 
pollutants that harm the environments of other states. 71 The Inter-
national Law Commission undertook to draft a treaty on harm 
from what it called "acts not prohibited by international law," 
which included liability for transboundary pollution and other 
harms resulting from high risk activity.72 A number of multilateral 
treaties provided liability for harms from such activity as maritime 
pollution, the falling of space satellites, and the operation of nu-
clear power plants. 73 An older rule that, in their use of interna-
tional rivers, states are not responsible to lower riparian states for 
diversion or pollution gave way to a rule of fair use, much like that 
found in domestic law.74 A convention was also negotiated to cur-
tail the depletion of the ozone layer. 75 
This new liability significantly expanded the scope of the re-
sponsibility of one state to another. It meant that liability existed 
not only for an act specifically directed to another state but for 
whatever activity might occur within a state-undertaken by the 
government or by private parties-that caused harm within an-
other state. All industrial activity was thus opened to international 
scrutiny. Even private persons and corporations could subject their 
states to international liability from their high risk industrial 
activity. 
E. Jus Cogens Norms 
The law of state responsibility also developed the idea of jus 
71. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 RECUEIL 
DES CouRs 99 (1967); Schneider, State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and 
Preservation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 602, 603 (1985); Trail 
Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941). 
72. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on International Liabil-
ity for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 
(1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 247 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 and Add. 1 and 2 (1980). 
73. See Quentin-Baxter, supra note 72, at 255 n.47 (treaties listed). 
74. Id. at 257. 
75. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 
Mar. 22, 1985, U.N. Doc. UNEP/lG.53/5/Rev.l, reprinted in 26 l.L.M. 1529 (1987); Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16. 
1987, reprinted in 26 l.L.M .. 1550 (1987); Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol on 
Chlorofiuorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1 
HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 225 (1988); Whitney, Talks on Ozone End in Britain Without Fixing 
Chemical Ban, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8. 1989, at A8, col. 1; Sorensen, International Agree-
ments-Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 HARV. INT'L 
L.J . 185 (1988). 
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cogens, or mandatory norms. The nineteenth century notion was 
that because international law is between and among states, the 
states may alter its norms at will. But the jus cogens idea was that 
there are certain norms of such transcending importance that 
states may not avoid them unilateraliy or by agreement with an-
other state. 76 Jus cog ens challenged the positivist view that states 
have the final word in establishing international law norms. 77 
Jus cogens reflected a concept of an international community. 
Like a domestic legal order, the international legal order has cer-
tain fundamental principles that may not be violated. With jus 
cogens, international law norms came to protect community inter-
ests. They reflected the existence of an international ordre 
public.78 
F. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The individual has for several centuries borne criminal respon-
sibility in international law. The first such crime was piracy, on the 
theory that the offense was against all humankind. A pirate was 
called hostis humanis generis. The crime of piracy implied a cer-
tain concept of a world community, since piracy was deemed to 
violate the world social order. Later, slave trading became a crime 
of individual responsibility, on the same theory. 
Individual criminal responsibility became more significant in 
the mid-twentieth century with the war crimes trials held after 
World War II, particularly at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Here too the 
concept was that the crimes affected the world social order. One 
formulation of crime was for widespread killing, which was denom-
inated "crime against humanity." The concept of war crimes was 
used extensively in the four 1949 Geneva humanitarian conven-
tions.79 Individual criminal responsibility reflected a concept of a 
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64. entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); Brownlie, To What 
Extent Are the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still Viable?, in 
CHANGE AND STABILITY, supra note 59, at 66, 71. 
77. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J . INT'L L. 359, 361 (1988). 
78. Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 61 AM. J . INT'L L. 946, 949 (1967). 
79. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 60, arts. 49-50; Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
supra note 60, arts. 50-51; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra 
note 60, arts. 129-130; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, supra note 60, arts. 146-147. 
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world community as well by making the individual directly respon-
sible before the international community. The individual's respon-
sibility ran not only to states whose laws she or he might violate, 
but also to an international body politic. 
G. State Criminal Responsibility 
The existence of a world community was also assumed by an 
idea that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century that a 
state may be guilty of a crime. Certain breaches of international 
law were deemed more serious than others and merited being con-
sidered offenses not simply against the party harmed, but against 
the world community. The concept of state crime opened the path 
to international action to curb the illegal acts of states. Its first 
major manifestation was in Chapter 7 of the United Nations Char-
ter, which provided for collective action in the event of aggression 
by a state. 
The state crime idea was expanded beyond aggression by the 
International Law Commission in its draft articles on state respon-
sibility.80 As elaborated by the Commission, major violations of 
human rights, forcible maintenance of colonialism or other forcible 
denial of the right to self-determination, and massive pollution of 
the environment are unlawful state actions against which the inter-
national community has a right to respond. 81 The International 
Law Commission's rationale was that these acts harm not only the 
individual victims but the world order as a whole. 82 
Historically, the emergence of a distinction between acts af-
fecting other rights-bearers only and acts affecting the interna-
tional community as a whole paralleled the development in domes-
tic law from regulation of disputes between clans to protection by 
the body politic of each individual-the development from tort to 
crime. 83 Harm to the individual was first handled by a law giving 
80. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19, in Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 59, 64. U.N. Doc. 
A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in (1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
1980/ Add. 1 (part 2). 
81. Id. 
82. Quigley, The International Law Commission 's Crime-Delict Distinction: A Tooth-
less Tiger?, 66 REVUE DE DROIT INT'L 117, 119 (1988). For opposition to the concept of inter-
national crime on the ground that there is not a genuine international community, see Wise, 
International Crimes and Domestic International Law, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 923, 931 (1989). 
83. Gounelle, Quelques Remarques sur la Notion de Crime International et sur 
l'Evolution de la Responsabilite Internationale de l'Etat, in MELANGES 0FFERTS 'A PAUL 
REUTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: UNITE ET DIVERSITE 315, 318 (1981). 
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the victim's clan redress against the perpetrator's clan and later 
developed into a law that posited that one who caused harm to an 
individual had violated an obligation of fealty to the sovereign. 
This development resulted in England in the emergence of the 
concept of felony, which meant a breach of the obligation of an 
individual to the sovereign. H 
As in domestic law, the development from tort to crime re-
flected a reform in the political order. In domestic law, the change 
from law as a regulator of inter-clan conflict to law as a regulator 
of relations between a sovereign and an individual paralleled the 
strengthening of the power of the state. The sovereign had claims 
against each individual. In international law, the introduction of 
state crime reflected a change from law as a regulator of interstate 
conflict to law as a regulator of relations in an international 
community. 
VI. A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STYLE 
Apart from the development of new norms, international law 
experienced a marked change in the process by which norms were 
created. Norm-creation became faster and simpler. As states dealt 
with each other on an ever widening range of issues, norms came to 
be established by multilateral treaty on many matters. The process 
of formation of norms of customary law was radically altered by 
the increasing interaction of states. Formerly, a period of time was 
necessary for the formation of a customary norm. But as states in-
teracted more frequently, norms formed rapidly.85 Joint state-
ments at international conferences came to be regarded as evi-
dence of state practice.86 Provisions of multilateral treaties came to 
be seen as reflecting customary law.87 
A new notion developed in international norm-creation that 
went under the name "soft law." Certain nascent norms were seen 
as being in a kind of gestation period, having some support in state 
84. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 69, at 442. 
85. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CusTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-60 (1971); Cassese, 
General Round-Up, in CHANGE AND STABILITY, supra note 59, at 166; North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42. 
86. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 1.C.J. 25. 
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
(1987); Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Developments, 34 AM. 
U.L. REV. 271-78 (1985); Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 
1073, 1076 (1986); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 
3, 41; A. D'AMATO, supra note 85, at 164-66; D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in 
International Law, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1146 (1982). 
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practice but not yet accepted as law.ss The concept of "soft law" 
gave some standing to concepts not fully accepted as norms. The 
designation ·speeded acceptance of the concept as a full norm. 
VII. THE NEW LAW AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
While the general tendency of the new norm-creation was to 
subject more areas of conduct within a state to international regu-
lation, there was a reverse tendency as well.s9 The Third World 
states pressed for non-interference in their affairs by the stronger 
states, thereby emphasizing their sovereignty. The Western hemi-
sphere states wrote into the O.A.S. Charter a strong provision 
against military intervention. 90 They were wary not only of troop 
intervention, but of economic intervention that might bring 
outside domination of their labor and material resources. 91 Third 
World states pressed for recognition of claims to broad stretches of 
coastal water as being under national jurisdiction, to protect them 
from use by the developed states, particularly for fishing. The out-
lawing of cross-border pollution also involved a strengthening of 
the sovereignty of the victim states. Thus, while the newly emerg-
ing law infringed the sovereignty of states, it often did so by 
strengthening the sovereignty of the states · who were potential vic-
tims of the conduct in question. 
The most significant tendency, still, was in the direction of er-
oding state sovereignty. The erosion came about in response to 
conditions that required states to act collectively, and this same 
necessity is likely to lead to a further substantial erosion of sover-
eignty. "[S]tates will be forced to agree voluntarily to a limitation 
on sovereignty that would allow for solutions to many problems of 
domestic development," said a leading Soviet international 
lawyer.92 
This encroachment on sovereignty elicited some objection. 
Certain developed states., seeing the dynamism in norm creation 
being taken over by the developing states, argued in the 1980s that 
customary law was forming too easily. The United States, for ex-
ample, argued, not without basis, that a customary norm could not 
88. CHANGE AND STABILITY, supra note 59, at 89-90 (statement of Georges Abi-Saab). 
89. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1984). 
90. Charter of the Organization of American States, opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948, 
arts. 15-18, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419-20, T.l.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 57-8 (1948). 
91. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 53-54. 
92. Blishchenko, supra note 20, at 111. 
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bind a state that "persistently objected" to its formation. 93 This 
represented a turnabout from an earlier period when it was the 
developing states and the U.S.S.R. that insisted on the consent of 
states as a basis for norm creation94 because they did not view 
themselves as having a role in creating customary norms. 
There was also concern that international law was restricting 
too significantly the unilateral action a state might find appropri-
ate to meet a perceived threat. The United States during the 
1980s, in justifying various military actions, advanced arguments 
that sought to expand the bases for justification of the use of 
force. 96 
While the encroachment on sovereignty was substantial, it 
represented merely an acceleration of a process of long standing, 
not a new process. Sovereignty had always been ceded when states 
perceived a need for international action. After World War I the 
right of states to go to war gave way to a prohibition against ag-
gressive force. Sovereignty was infringed in the aim of preventing 
another major war. Even as "domestic" an issue as employer-em-
ployee relations gave way in the early twentieth century to a lim-
ited degree of international regulation. The Bolshevik Revolution 
in Russia in 1917 presented the possibility of the overthrow of gov-
ernments by groups espousing worker rights. The major powers 
viewed worker rebellion as a threat to themselves.96 So in 1919 
they established the International Labor Organization and in its 
constitution identified discontent among workers as a threat to 
world peace: 
And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, 
hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce 
unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are 
imperilled. 97 
The preamble drew the conclusion that "improvement of those 
conditions is urgently required" and listed as areas of reform: 
hours of work, prevention of unemployment, wage levels, work-re-
lated disease and injury, protection of children, and freedom of 
93. See Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary 
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1985). 
94. Quigley, supra note 4, at 15. 
95. Quigley, The Reagan Administration's Legacy to International Law, 2 TEMP. INT'L 
& COMP. L.J. 199, 200-04 (1988). 
96. A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 10 (1971). 
97. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9. 1946, Preamble, 15 
U.N.T.S. 35 (amended text, but no change in this language from 1919 version). 
23
Quigley: Law for a  World Community
Published by SURFACE, 1989
24 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:1 
worker association.98 
Sovereignty was eroded in another way as well in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. International law came increasingly 
to be applied domestically. Historically, the division between do-
mestic law and international law was sharp. International law, as a 
law between states was handled in foreign offices and through in-
ternational negotiation. It had only limited impact on the law ap-
plied in domestic courts. Increasingly, however, international law 
impacted on the law applied in domestic courts. 
This phenomenon was most dramatic in Europe, where do-
mestic law was displaced by European Community law through 
public administration at the community level, and through a com-
munity court with power to enforce community law against con-
flicting domestic law.99 As indicated above, Europe's human rights 
procedures also impacted significantly on domestic courts in 
Europe.100 
Elsewhere, the rate of increase of international law was less 
dramatic. But the steady growth of international interaction 
brought an increasing number of internationally-related disputes 
into domestic courts. As states became more involved in commer-
cial activity in the twentieth century, courts abandoned their for-
mer notion that states enjoy absolute immunity from court juris-
diction in other states and adjudicated claims against them. 101 
Domestic courts began to apply human rights law.102 With the in-
crease in international air travel, domestic courts routinely applied 
the international rules on the liability of air carriers embodied in 
the Warsaw Convention. 103 
VIII. THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While international law in the nineteenth century was a law 
for states, this concept was substantially eroded in the latter half 
of the ·twentieth century. Individual persons, groups, and corpora-
tions began to play an international role and started to become the 
98. Id. 
99. D. WYA'IT & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 53-55 (1980). 
100. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
101. See, e.g., Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 1950 l.L.R. 155 (Austria Supreme 
Court 1950). 
102. Filartiga v. Pefta-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. 
Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd. on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). 
103. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 49 U.S.C.A. App. § 1502 (1976). See, e.g., 
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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bearers of rights and obligations under international law. 
A. Citizen Groups 
Individuals and groups began to lobby states on their positions 
on international law issues. The negotiations leading to the 1982 
Law of the Sea Treaty, for example, involved considerable lobby-
ing by citizen groups seeking equitable distribution of deep seabed 
resources and strong environmental protection. The United Na-
tions has encouraged these efforts by giving citizen groups access 
to the United. Nations. It thus allows these groups, which it 
designates non-governmental organizations, to make their views 
known to relevant United Nations bodies. 
This development was facilitated by the increasing ease of in-
ternational communication and transportation, which allowed like-
minded individuals worldwide to be in touch with each other.104 
Persons with common interests united on issues of common con-
cern.106 Workers supported the demands of workers in other states 
for improved wages or work conditions, and writers supported the 
demands of writers in other states for greater freedom of 
expression. 106 
Citizen groups, often worldwide in membership, came to con-
stitute an influential constituency in the international legal 
arena. 107 Many citizen groups had a serious impact on the policies 
of governments. In West Germany, citizen groups opposed to nu-
clear weaponry were instrumental in the West German govern-
ment's decision to urge other NATO states to reduce the levels of 
their weaponry. Non-governmental human rights monitoring orga-
nizations generated considerable pressure on states by publicizing 
rights violations. The Greenpeace organization blocked ships fish-
ing for endangered species and disrupted nuclear weapons testing. 
With the emergence of human rights law and individual crimi-
nal responsibility, individuals increasingly viewed themselves as di-
rect participants in the international system, apart from their affil-
iation with a state. They invoked international law in domestic 
104. The level of transactions between persons of different states is said to double every 
ten years. Inkeles, The Emerging Social Structure of the World, 27 WORLD PoL. 467, 479 
(1975). 
105. See A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 414-17. 
106. Dore, University and Diversity in World Culture, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 407, 418. 
107. Galtung, Self-Reliance: An Overriding Strategy for Transition, in 1 TOWARD A 
JusT WORLD ORDER 602, 616-17 (1982); A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 410. 
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courts. Persons charged with criminal offenses for acts that chal-
lenged their governments, appealed to international law as a legal 
basis for their actions. They asserted a violation of international 
law by the state as justification for their own action or said that 
their state's action was unlawful and that as a citizen they would 
be responsible for an international crime by permitting the action 
to continue.108 
The increasing role of individuals and groups added a new ele-
ment of strength to international law. If there is to be a world com-
munity, it must enjoy the support of the subjects of that commu-
nity. Just as domestic governmental processes remain 
representative only if the citizenry is interested and vigilant, so in-
ternational processes can serve the welfare of the world community 
only if the world community insists that these ends be served. It 
was said of the League of Nations that one reason it was unable to 
keep the peace was that there had not developed "a public opinion 
in the service of peace," and that nationalistic feeling prevailed 
over a demand that states not go to war.109 But in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, substantial support developed for interna-
tional procedures directed at promoting the survival needs of the 
world community. 
B. Business Corporations 
Multinational corporations-another type of non-state ac-
tor-also came to exert pressure on governments, lobbying states 
on international legal issues. The strong negative reaction of the 
United States to the "common heritage of mankind" principle in 
the General Assembly's Moon Treaty resulted primarily from pres-
sure of mining corporations concerned that the Treaty's "common 
heritage" principle regarding the Moon's mineral resources would 
hamper their projected exploration and mining of the Moon.110 
Pressure from these companies also influenced the United States 
to back away from the "common heritage of mankind" principle in 
the Law of the Sea Treaty.111 
108. See F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-10 
(1987). 
109. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-56 (P. Cor-
bett trans. 1957); see also E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS (1919-1939) at 37-38 (1962). 
110. Richardson, In Pursuit of a Law of the Sea, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1980, at A22, 
col. 3. 
111. Deep Seabed Mining, Hearings on H.R. 3350 and H.R. 4582: Hearings Before the 
House Subcomm. on Oceanography, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 135, 191, 205, 228, 311, 345 (state-
26
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/2
1989] Law for a World Community 27 
Corporations to date have had only a marginal role in interna-
tional organizations. It has been suggested that they should have a 
role in international law-making.112 However, with the exception of 
the International Labor Organization, which provides for direct 
participation by labor and business, corporations have not been 
given a significant role in law-making or other activities of interna-
tional organizations.113 
Nonetheless, corporations are significant international actors, 
some commanding resources that dwarf those of many states. Like 
individuals and citizen groups, they have come to form an impor-
tant element of the world community. 
IX. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONA.L INSTITUTIONS 
International institutions have also become important actors 
in international affairs. While international institutions are created 
by states, they often develop a life of their own and play an inde-
pendent role. In the late twentieth century, international institu-
tions came to occupy an important position in international life.114 
Many were at the regional level, reflecting a search for solutions to 
problems in concert with neighboring states. 115 In the 1980s the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States were added to the existing regional organizations. The 
EEC gradually replaced the individual European states as eco-
nomic and political actors. With its 1992 changes, the EEC re-
flected a high level of economic, political, and legal integration, 
permitting supranational decisions binding on member states on a 
broad range of issues.116 A number of regional economic organiza-
tions were established to coordinate economic policy. Regional or-
ganizations became a significant factor in the international legal 
order. 
International institutions of universal scope came to manage 
an increasing range of international work in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Many were associated with the United Nations, 
and much of their activity related to economic development. The 
ments of corporate representatives). 
112. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, 
1983 DUKE L.J . 748, 754-56. 
113. Id. at 750-51. 
114. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (1964). 
115. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 411. 
116. Meessen, Europe en Route to 1991: The Completion of the Internal Market and 
Its Impact on Non-Europeans, 23 lNT'L LAW. 359 (1989). 
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United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, for example, 
along with several score of other inter-governmental organizations, 
worked to improve food supplies.117 
Cold war differences between the major powers put serious 
limitations on the role of international institutions. Those differ-
ences kept the Security Council from playing the role projected for 
it in the United Nations Charter. In the 1980s Soviet President 
Gorbachev called for greater use of international institutions in 
solving regional conflicts and in resolving the problems of poverty 
and ecological spoliation.118 Gorbachev called for greater use by 
states of the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes, and 
moved sharply from the U.S.S.R.'s traditional wariness of before-
the-fact submission of disputes to compulsory international 
adjudication. 119 
The Soviet overture to the United Nations and International 
Court of Justice was significant because of the U.S.S.R.'s tradi-
tional caution on ceding powers to international bodies. A Soviet 
international lawyer saw a need for "voluntary recognition of a cer-
tain degree of supranationality for international mechanisms and 
of the absolute binding character of their decisions. "120 The 
U.S.S.R. agreed to make long-avoided payments to finance United 
Nations peacekeeping operations. 
The Soviet initiatives at the United Nations opened the possi-
bility that the organization might be able to achieve the goals set 
out in its Charter in 1945. In the late 1980s, in fact, the United 
Nations brokered the end to a number of long-standing military 
conflicts, notably those in Afghanistan, Wes tern Sahara, Namibia 
and Iran-Iraq. 
After World War I, and again after World War II, the initia-
tive for international institutions came from the major powers. De-
termined to protect the world from the scourge of war, they estab-
lished international mechanisms. By the 1960s, the initiative came 
from the newly independent states, who pressed for a world order 
premised on the view that the resources should be distributed 
117. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NUTRITION AND HUMAN NEEDS, THE UNITED STATES, FAO 
AND WORLD FOOD POLITICS' U.S. RELATIONS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL FOOD ORGANIZATION, 
STAFF REPORT, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1976); Puchala & Hopkins, Toward Innovation in 
the Global Food Regime, 32 INT'L 0RG'N 855 (1978). 
118. Aide-memoire, Sept. 22, 1988, U.N. Doc. A/43/629, Annex (1988). 
119. Franck, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviving the 
United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 539 (1989). 
120. Blishchenko, supra note 20, at 111. 
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more equitably.121 International institutions increasingly served 
the ends of economic development. 
X. LAW FOR A WORLD COMMUNITY 
The nineteenth century view that international law was a law 
for states was eroded by the many changes in the substance of in-
ternational law and in the process by which it is created, as well as 
by the appearance of non-state actors and international institu-
tions. These changes tended in the direction of creating a law for 
what was increasingly viewed as a world community with interests 
of its own. "The one world in which the law now operates is a 
world which, despite constant setbacks, is in process of organizing 
itself as a world community," wrote C. Wilfred Jenks in 1969.122 
Wolfgang Friedmann in 1964 said that a "co-operative law" 
was emerging. "Unlike the traditional law of nations," he wrote, 
which is predicated on the assumption of conflicts of national in-
terests, cooperative international law requires a community of in-
terests. The challenge posed by the changes in the structure of con-
temporary international society does not eliminate the pivotal 
importance of self-interest in international relations; it does, how-
ever, radically affect the dimensions and objectives of self-interest. 
The emerging international organizations are tentative expressions 
of new world-wide interests in security, survival and co-operation 
for the preservation and development of vital needs and resources 
of mankind. 123 
There are several requisites for the formation of a world com-
munity. One is that individuals must perceive themselves as citi-
zens not only of their states, but of a world community. They must 
feel a responsibility for what occurs elsewhere, just as they do for 
what occurs in their states. "It would make a difference to the pos-
sibilities of international order if people in Maine should feel the 
same degree of responsibility toward the people of Japan or Chile 
or Indo-China as they feel towards California," wrote Ronald 
Dore.124 But most individuals still distinguish their own nationals 
and foreigners as "us" and "them" and place a higher priority on 
the welfare of the "us." 
121. Johnston, The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare, in THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 111, 118-120 (1978). 
122. C. JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? A STUDY OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 219 (1969). 
123. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 114, at 367. 
124. Dore, supra note 106, at 413. 
29
Quigley: Law for a  World Community
Published by SURFACE, 1989
30 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 16:1 
A sense of concern and responsibility may be lacking as well 
when governments are called upon to act. It is said that the reason 
that the League of Nations was unable to stop Italy's aggression 
against Ethiopia was that, while the European states were willing 
to condemn it verbally, they were unwilling to take action that 
would have been costly to them to stop a wrong that had occurred 
in a distant location.126 De Visscher wrote in 1953 that there was 
on the part of states only a "very weak perception of common 
good" that "prevents us from speaking of an international commu-
nity as something already established. m 26 He cautioned against 
concluding that a "social community" existed at the world level 
simply "because it would be socially good to have it so."127 Within 
states it took a long period of time for individuals to develop a 
sense of citizenry in the state, as opposed to a loyalty to village, 
locality, or clan. Indeed, in many places, particularly in Africa and 
the Middle East, where states are still recent phenomena, that 
shift in loyalty is far from completed. A world outlook, however, is 
necessary if global problems are to be addressed effectively. 
Whether individuals or states can sufficiently develop a world-
view outlook, instead of a state-view outlook, is problematic. "The 
historical distribution of power has implanted group morals," 
wrote De Visscher, "and the relations that spring from them rest 
neither on the perception of an extranational common good nor on 
the consciousness of a destiny common to all men. "128 But citizen 
groups, like those pressing for human rights, for peace, and for en-
vironmental protection, are urging an "extranational" outlook and 
have convinced a wide sector of the public in many states to adopt 
such a view. 
There has developed a concept that international law must op-
erate to promote the well-being of the world community. This con-
cept is at odds with the nineteenth century view that international 
law is whatever stat.es agree to make it, 129 and that moral concerns 
are secondary.130 Sometimes viewed as a return to natural law from 
positivism, the twentieth century approach is that law is not sim-
ply what states say it is, but that law must promote the general 
125. C. DE V1sscHER, supra note 109, at 58. 
126. Id. at 72. While the English translation was published in 1957, the French original 
was published in 1953. 
127. See id. at 88. 
128. See id. at 95-96. See also Murphy, supra note 29, at 337. 
129. C. DE V1sscHER, supra note 109, at 51-52; S. KIM, supra note 30, at 33. 
130. Brownlie, supra note 39, at 359-60. 
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welfare. 
This approach was reflected in the statements of political 
figures, regarding military conflict situations; their aim was to 
achieve peace with justice. During World War I, this idea was asso-
ciated with President Woodrow Wilson, who saw self-determina-
tion of peoples as a prerequisite for a lasting peace. The idea was 
also taken up by those who saw in the existing international order 
a preservation of a position of domination by wealthier states and 
by wealthier individuals within states. The world community, it 
was argued, should pursue the goal of equitable distribution of re-
sources. After the demise of political colonialism in Africa and 
Asia, the newly independent states took up this notion, arguing for 
economic policies at the international level that would allow them 
to compete with the developed states. The idea was also framed by 
depicting the existing order as inherently unjust, and able to main-
tain itself only through a kind of systemic violence.131 
XI. OBSTACLES TO THE EMERGENCE OF A WORLD COMMUNITY 
The kind of world community that could cope with survival 
issues effectively is only in its nascent stage. There are serious ob-
stacles in the path of its full development. Can a law be developed 
for a world community when law around the world is quite di-
verse? Is culture too diverse to support a common law for the 
world? Are political systems too diverse? Are the economic differ-
ences between the wealthy and poor states too significant for there 
to be the common interests necessary for a world community? Are 
states too substantial an obstacle? 
A. Diversity of Law 
Commonality has long been sought as a basis for international 
law. In the seventeenth century, Grotius tried to determine 
whether a Europe composed of independent states could support a 
law that would be applicable among them. He sought a basis for an 
international law in commonalities in the norms followed in Euro-
pean states. 132 When the government of France, in the wake of the 
French Revolution, espoused new principles of governance, it was 
131. Galtung, A Structural Theory of Imperialism, 8 J. PEACE RES. 81 (1971); Asbjorn 
Eide, International Law, Dominance and the Use of Force, 11 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1974) . 
132. H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. Campbell trans. 1901, originally 
published 1625); Bozeman, Does International Law Have a Future?, 6 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT1L & 
COMP. L. 289, 290 (1985) . 
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feared that a basis for an international law applicable throughout 
Europe had been eliminated. In the twentieth century, the ques-
tion has been raised as to whether international law might have 
lost its base of commonality as it expanded beyond European-
based societies to include those of Asia, the Middle East and Af-
rica.133 The issue was also raised by representatives of governments 
that purported to function on bases different from those of other 
states. The Soviet government that came to power in Russia in 
1917 said that it was of a new type and that the norms found in 
the society it was creating differed from those found in other 
states. On that basis, it argued that international law was possible, 
as between it and other states, on only a limited basis. 
If the differences in legal norms accepted by the various states 
are too great, then achieving common solutions through law may 
be difficult. While differences are significant, there is on the whole 
a remarkable degree of cohesion. That cohesion is in some measure 
a product of the industrial revolution. As Wes tern European trad-
ers established worldwide networks for the sale of goods in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, they took with them concepts 
of law necessary for commercial relations. Already in Europe a 
common body of commercial custom, called law merchant, had 
developed. 
As the European powers established colonies in the Americas 
and later in south and southeast Asia and in Africa, they enacted 
law based on their own. In some cases the European system be-
came nearly exclusive of the indigenous system, as in the Americas, 
whereas in others it coexisted with the indigenous system, as was 
generally the case in Africa. But even though it did not everywhere 
become the exclusive law, European law had a considerable im-
pact. In the early twentieth century, even absent colonization, Eu-
ropean law was used in Japan and China as a model for legal re-
form. During the same period, in the Middle East, Great Britain 
and France established a quasi-colonial control and legislated on 
their own models. 
The unity of European law survived the establishment of the 
U.S.S.R. and its allied states in the twentieth century. While intro-
ducing new features into their legal systems, these states remained 
within the European legal tradition.134 The legal style and language 
of France and Great Britain, the two major nineteenth century col-
133. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 70-71. 
134. Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 301 (1989). 
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onizers, came to be that of diplomacy, and continued to be used in 
the major multilateral treaties. 
B. Diversity of Culture 
Another difficulty in a transition to a world community law is 
variance in culture. It has been argued that cultures are too diverse 
to support a world system of law.136 Moreover, in the post-colonial 
period, Third World states have strived to maintain their cultures 
against Western domination, through such initiatives as the New 
International Information Order, whose aim was to combat the 
dominance in the news media of a First World outlook. In the Is-
lamic world, religion was reasserted in a way that separated its fol-
lowers farther from Western culture.136 Internationally, a certain 
commonality of culture exists within elites, largely a Western-de-
rived culture. But outside the West, this culture is not shared be-
yond the elite groups.137 
Cultural differences have surfaced during many efforts at in-
ternational regulation. Polygamy is viewed by some as a violation 
of the rights of women, while by others it is viewed as a reflection 
of certain cultures. The circumcision of young girls, practiced in 
many parts of Africa, is widely viewed as a violation of human 
rights, but some justify the practice as a reflection of a culture. 
On the other hand, there is a certain commonality in seem-
ingly diverse cultures. While nineteenth century Europeans drew a 
sharp line between the civilized and uncivilized parts of the world, 
with Europe and its settler colonies in the Americas as the civilized 
parts, Europe itself had drawn on other cultures to create what it 
had become by the time of its industrial revolution. Much of its · 
culture stemmed from ancient Egypt and other parts of the Middle 
East. Until the fifteenth century, Spain was under Arab rule. 
Mathematics, science, medicine and technology were more ad-
vanced there than in northern Europe. Indeed, northern Europe 
drew on this Arab learning to create its industrial revolution. Is-
lam, the religion predominating in the Arab world, is a seventh 
century offshoot of Christianity. 
135. A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 161-62 (1971); Boze-
man, The International Order in a Multicultural World, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 387, 404. 
136. Bozeman, The International Order in a Multicultural World, in THE EXPANSION 
OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 387, 401. 
137. H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 317 
(1977). 
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Law, in either a domestic or international setting, presumes a 
certain commonality within the community to which it applies.138 
Communities within states evidence considerable cultural diver-
sity, but support legal orders nonetheless. The cultural diversity 
found in states has increased in the twentieth centuries as states 
have come to encompass a greater number of persons of different 
cultures. The United States received migrants from Europe in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and from Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East from mid-century. In Africa, Eu-
ropean colonizing powers drew borders that divided cultures and 
cast groups representing a variety of cultures into a single political 
system. Those borders were retained after independence. Despite 
having people of widely diverse backgrounds, states have managed 
to maintain functioning legal systems. 
International law, it has been said, "rests on a distinctive 
value foundation that embraces universal human values held in 
common by all nations."139 These values represent what can be 
agreed upon, given cultural differences. In view of the need for co-
operation, states endeavor to overcome cultural differences that 
stand in the way of solutions to pressing problems.140 Law can 
function internationally despite cultural differences. The differ-
ences need, however, to be taken into account. For example, Wes-
terners read written agreements such as contracts or treaties quite 
literally, while Easterners are more concerned with the spirit un-
derlying the relationship and are less prone to split hairs; this is a 
factor to be considered in drafting international agreements, 141 but 
it does not eliminate the possibility of agreements. 
It is important, finally, that a law for the world community 
not exclude populations that desire to be a part of it. Where origi-
nal inhabitants of a territory no longer exercise political authority, 
as in North America or Australia, they must be a part of the com-
munity that forms the basis for a world community law, or they 
must not be considered bound by it. The danger is that they will 
be considered bound, but will have no effective role in formulating 
it or administering it. 
138. Id. 
139. Vereshchetin & Danilenko, Cultural and Ideological Pluralism and International 
Law, 29 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 56, 59 (1986). 
140. Id. at 58. 
141. Dore, University and Diversity in World Culture, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 408-09. 
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C. Diversity of Political Systems 
It is argued that a community at the world level presupposes a 
similarity of domestic political orders. Even the unity that pres-
ently exists, it is said, has been possible only because of a certain 
political conformity. "[T]he process by which Asian and African 
political communities did come to enter into such reciprocal rela-
tions and to enjoy full rights as members of international society 
was inseparable from domestic processes of political and social re-
form which narrowed the differences between them and the politi-
cal communities of the West, and contributed to a process of con-
vergence. "142 European integration is taken to show that economic 
and political integration is possible only on the basis of a common-
ality in political systems. 
Diversity in political orders is likely, however, to remain a fea-
ture of the international order for the foreseeable future. While the 
European system of parliamentary rule has spread to other areas, 
systems that are religion-based or based on monarchy or oligarchy 
predominate in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The Soviet gov-
ernment initially said that only a limited body of international law 
could exist between it and other states because of differences in 
their domestic political orders, but as the twentieth century 
progressed it entered into a wide range of international-legal rela-
tions. Both it and its allied Eastern European states, in the 1980s, 
moved towards parliamentary rule of the Western European type. 
While political similarity facilitates integration at the world 
level, it is not a prerequisite for a significant level of integration. 
Moreover, as the perception sharpens that international action is 
needed to assure survival, differences are likely to be overcome. 
D. Economic Differentials 
Another obstacle to a world community is the extreme dis-
crepancy in living standards between the developing and devel-
oped states. Those states that underwent an industrial revolution 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are far ahead of those 
that did not. Comparing the poorest states to the most affluent, 
the literacy rate goes from twenty percent to over ninety-five per-
cent, infant morality (per one thousand live births) from 120 to 20, 
the percentage of the population that is malnourished from thirty-
142. Bull, The Emergence of a Universal International Society, in THE EXPANSION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 117, 122. 
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five percent to virtually none, and life expectancy from the mid 40s 
to the early 70s.143 The wealth discrepancy between the wealthiest 
and the poorest states, moreover, is not diminishing but increasing. 
It has grown steadily and substantially over the past century.144 
Large differences in living standards exist, of course, within 
individual states, mirroring in some instances the degree of differ-
ence between the developed and developing states. While it is not 
impossible for rich and poor to exist in the same political system, 
the difference imposes a strain. Further, in individual states, no 
decision was made for rich and poor to come together; the situa-
tion evolved over time. For a rich state, it is difficult to decide on 
greater integration with states that may be a drain on their assets, 
or whose labor comes cheaper. The entry into the European Eco-
nomic Community of Spain and Portugal, for example, was diffi-
cult because of the two states lower economic levels. 
E. States as an Obstacle 
De Visscher viewed the likelihood of the development of a 
community at the international level as a function of the type of 
state that predominates. "There will be no international commu-
nity," he said, "so long as the political ends of the State over-
shadow the human ends of power."146 He saw the states under na-
tional socialism as prone to aggression by manipulating the 
citizenry, and thus that they were the "born enemy to interna-
tional organization. "146 His point was that states concerned about 
their own power are less likely to cede authority in the interest of 
creating a better world. 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the international 
order came to include a larger number of states, as colonialism en-
ded in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This meant that there 
were more states to disagree among themselves and made it harder 
to achieve international consensus on major issues.147 At the same 
time, however, it had the effect of spreading power and thus 
worked against the concentration of power that had existed under 
colonialism. 
Whereas a state is composed of individuals, over whom it can 
143. J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 41. 
144. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 48-49. 
145. C. DE V1sscHER, supra note 109, at 93. 
146. Id. at 123. 
147. Brownlie, supra note 39, at 369. 
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exercise authority, the states that compose the international order 
have their own powers of decision-making. Even inside states, how-
ever, individuals are not equal actors. Some control more resources 
and enjoy substantial decision-making power. Large groupings, like 
major business corporations, play a role in terms of their influence 
that in some ways is comparable to that of states in the interna-
tional legal order. Just as states and individuals are not on a par in 
terms of power in the international legal order, so corporations and 
individuals are not on a par in the domestic legal order. 
International law has long lived with the disparity in power 
among states. That disparity has caused serious strains, and inter-
national law has had to accommodate to the disparity, 148 but it has 
not prevented the functioning of the system. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
There is historical precedent for the proposition that the dra-
matic social and economic change of the late twentieth century will 
lead to a new role for law. The last two major changes in the politi-
cal-legal order of Europe both occurred at periods of major socio-
economic change. The twelfth century saw the emergence of the 
papacy as a political institution and of the modern Western con-
cept of a legal system.149 This occurred at a time of technological 
innovation that transformed productive processes and com-
merce-rudders on ships, and in agriculture the development of 
the harness and a sophisticated plough.150 The next major politi- . 
cal-legal change, which led to state sovereignty and separation of 
powers, occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with 
the Peace of Westphalia, the English Bill of Rights, the Enlighten-
ment, and the French Revolution. This change came at the time of 
the development of the steam engine and large scale industry, re-
placing craft production. m 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, international law 
increased in the scope of relations regulated, and in processes to 
effectuate .its norms. As international law reformed itself, the nine-
148. See, e.g., within the United Nations, the allocation to five states of permanent 
seats on the Security Council, and the right of each of veto resolutions on non-procedural 
issues. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 23, 27. 
149. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-
TION 86-87 (1983). 
150. Id. at 520; J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 23; S. LILLEY, MEN, MACHINES AND HIS-
TORY: THE STORY OF TOOLS AND MACHINES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS 49-53 (1966). 
151. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 34-37; J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 24-25. 
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teenth century's bright line between international law and domes-
tic jurisdiction was obliterated. Few realms of domestic legal policy 
remained immune from international law. The shifting of power 
relations in the late twentieth century, and the diminution of the 
superpower conflict as a determinant of international relations, co-
incided with a perception that the survival of humankind was in 
jeopardy. That perception forced states to rethink international re-
lations as a common quest for survival. The diminution of the Cold 
War in the 1980s opened the path to superpower cooperation in 
resolving the survival issues. Indeed, the superpower conflict that 
had defined world politics at mid-century was fading as a united 
Europe and Japan advanced economically. Global solutions that 
were politically infeasible in the 1970s were realistic by 1990. 
The changes and dangers present in contemporary interna-
tional life require a transcendence of the state as the only decision-
making unit. While the state will likely retain a substantial role, 
increasingly international institutions must set policy, and individ-
uals and non-state groupings must play a role that gives them a 
sense of responsibility for the world community. The planet is con-
fronted by problems that cannot be solved by individual states act-
ing separately. If the planet is to support life, solutions must be 
devised in common. 
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